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1 Introduction 
On its way towards the year 2000 the Norwegian economy appears to be in top shape. "A 
successful economy in an ocean of unsuccessful economies"; this is the way Norwegian 
experts in self-diagnosis describe the situation. "Ein Volk steckt bis zum Hals in Schlagsahne" 
(a nation which is embedded in whipped cream up to its neck) writes DER SPIEGEL. Almost 
no European country fulfils the convergence criteria for the European Economic and 
Monetary Union to a higher degree than the non-member-country Norway. In 1997 the 
unemployment rate went down to 4.1% and is expected to decrease further in 1998. In 1996 
the rate of inflation has reached a value of 1.3% which from a historical point of view is very 
low (Table 1). 
 
The present situation is quite a new experience for the Norwegians. In the eighties the country 
was confronted with a severe economic crisis: a strong and long-lasting wage-price spiral 
caused a fall in international competitiveness and resulted in a tremendous reduction of the 
number of industrial jobs. The situation indicated that the  "Dutch disease" affected this 
country which is blessed with vast natural resources.1 In addition, the country suffered from 
adjustment problems brought about by the political situation. The growing globalisation lead 
to a change in the paradigm of Norwegian monetary policy in 1986. This brought about a  
"stabilisation crisis" which culminated in a big bank crash and a subsequent government take-
over of the biggest commercial banks in the country in 1989/90. It was a crisis of economic 
and structural adaptation, which resulted in the highest unemployment rate after World War II 
to this Scandinavian welfare state. We are talking about a country which has this abundance 
of natural resources and which had made full employment a constitutional obligation.  
 
But the  "Norwegian miracle" of the nineties cannot only be explained by the fact that 
Norway really started to exploit its natural resources. Moreover, the resource boom caused by 
vast earnings from the exploitation of petroleum resources has also been used to explain the 
structural problems and the  "lingering illness" of the same economy. We have to analyse 
whether the economic policy is aimed at using the revenues from the petroleum sector  
"productively" in order to promote employment and economic growth, and does not prevent  
any structural change in the economy. 
                                               
1
 For a survey see Corden 1984. 
  
 
2 
The Norwegian economy is strongly dependent on foreign trade and economic integration. 
Nevertheless, in the 1994 referendum Norwegians rejected membership of the European 
Union. Many experts expected a serious setback for the whole economy. But actually, the 
traditional Norwegian export sector, heavily dependent on Western European markets, 
improved its international competitiveness, a fact that is quite contrary to the traditional 
concept of economic integration. 
 
How can it be explained that Norway could return to full employment so fast, coping with the 
deepest economic crisis since the thirties so successfully?  
How and to what extent can a small open economy like Norway - in the age of expanding 
internationalisation and diminishing effectiveness of national economic policy instruments - 
make use of policy strategies aimed at overall national goals of growth and full employment? 
How can it be explained that the Norwegian economy, heavily dependent on export sales, 
experienced an upswing at the same time when the most important trading partners Germany 
and Sweden were experiencing their worst economic crises since World War II ? 
 
All these questions cannot be sufficiently answered by traditional macroeconomic analysis. 
Important institutional, political and structural conditions have to be investigated and the 
results have to be put together like a  "jigsaw puzzle". In this we may find out to what extent 
economic policy experiences gained in one country can be transferred to and used by another 
country. 
 
In the following I will discuss some important hypotheses which might help us to arrive at 
some answers to the questions asked above. In the age of mass unemployment and 
discussions about the competitiveness of  "Standort Deutschland", comparative studies of 
national economic policies could be of special interest. 
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2 Lasting high unemployment and policy recommendations 
High unemployment in many OECD countries continues to be an issue in the professional and 
political discussion.2 The unemployment rate of the European OECD countries has been 10% 
or even higher for a long period.3 Especially Germany, the leading European economy, has 
suffered from mass unemployment for many years. 
 
The discussion on the causes of high unemployment in the European countries focuses on 
labour saving technological change, competition from low-wage countries and the negative 
impacts of increasing globalisation on employment. More labour market regulation and trade 
protection may be popular remedies in this respect. But globalisation and increasing interna-
tional competition is a process that is here to stay. Therefore, the unemployment problem has 
to be considered as a growing “adjustment gap” in the OECD economies, the gap between an 
increasing need to adjust to rapid changes and a decreasing ability and willingness to adapt. 
 
Globalisation enforces competition. Job destruction is a natural consequence, and “the basic 
answer to employment problems lies in creating more new jobs”4, especially in the private 
sector. A “balanced mix of macroeconomic and structural policies” is needed in order to 
strengthen the economy's ability to adjust to structural change and the capacity to innovate 
and to create new jobs.5 An effective policy mix should cope with the following issues: 
1. A stable macroeconomic environment including sound public finances, controlled infla-
tion and stable growth in aggregate demand will provide a framework for sustainable 
growth of output and employment. 
2. An enhanced creation and diffusion of technological know-how will create new jobs: a 
policy aimed at establishing a climate of competition, innovation and creativity is essen-
tial. It must give firms better incentives to innovate, reduce risks by developing informa-
tion sharing and network access, adapt technologically oriented education and training for 
both enterprises and individuals. 
3. A favourable entrepreneurial climate will encourage enterprise creation in the economy. 
Improve information and advice! Improve access to technology, training, credit and 
                                               
2
 OECD 1994 and 1995a. 
3
 OECD Labour Force Statistics 1997. 
4
 OECD 1994. 
5
 OECD 1995a. 
  
 
4 
guarantee schemes! Lower other entry barriers by removing regulations! New jobs will be 
created in small and medium sized innovative companies. 
4. More working-time flexibility – both short-term and lifetime – will increase labour market 
flexibility and make it easier to create new jobs. Working-time reductions may be inte-
grated with programs for life-long learning. 
5. Increased wage and labour cost flexibility will dismantle barriers to job creation. Decrease 
non-wage labour costs by reducing taxes on labour! Establish more wage flexibility and a 
wage formation system which pays more importance to local conditions in the wage 
formation process! Policies aimed at enforcing competition in the product markets will 
reduce the firm’s ability to restrict output and employment and to exploit rent sharing with 
the “employed” insiders. 
6. A reform of employment benefit systems may give stronger incentives to replace paid 
unemployment by paid employment. This includes policy measures to enforce job search, 
to restrict the duration of benefits and to lower the relative tax burden on paid work. 
7. Active labour market policies will raise the employability of the unemployed, in particular 
the long-term and unskilled unemployed. Improve the functioning of the Public Employ-
ment Service and target training programmes to unemployed! 
8. Improved skills and competence of the labour force becomes more important in an era of 
increasing global competition and rapid structural change. This includes areas of general 
school education, school-to-work transition, on-the-job training and life-long learning. 
 
All these instruments may contribute to reducing unemployment as far as they are well 
designed, well targeted and co-ordinated. There has been and there is an ongoing debate on 
how to overcome unemployment in Europe6. Traditionally there has been little interest in the 
Norwegian case with few exeptions7. 
 
                                               
6
 Layard, Nickell, Jackman 1991. OECD 1994 and 1995a. "The Challenge of Full Employment in the Global 
Economy" 1997. 
7Dølvik and Steen 1997. OECD 1997, 1998. 
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3 The recent development in the Norwegian labour market 
Norway has been a full employment economy most of the time since the 1950s. In 1983-1992 
the average unemployment rate was 3.8% compared to a rate of 9.4% for the EU-countries 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Main economic indicators in Norway and other countries  
 
Average 
1983-92 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
Average 
2000-02 
GNP growth 
Norway 
 
2.7 
 
2.8 
 
5.0 
 
3.3 
 
5.3 
 
3.4 
 
2.5 
 
2.5 
 
2.5 
Mainland Norway 1.8 2.8 4.3 2.7 3.7 3.7 3.0 1.2 1.7 
Trading partners 2.6 -0.2 3.0 2.5 1.9 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 
EU 2.7 -0.5 2.8 2.5 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 
Consumer price index 
(annual growth) 
Norway 
 
 
5.4 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
1.4 
 
 
2.5 
 
 
1.3 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
2.2 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
2.7 
Trading partners 4.6 2.9 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.7 2.2 
EU 5.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.5 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.2 
Unemployment (% of 
the labour force) 
Norway 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
6.0 
 
 
5.4 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
4.1 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
3.2 
 
 
.. 
Trading partners 6.7 9.3 9.4 8.8 8.9 8.7 8.0 8.0 .. 
EU 9.4 11.1 11.6 11.2 11.3 11.2 10.7 10.2 .. 
Source: Nasjonalbudsjett 1997, 1998 and 1999. 
 
In the seventies and eighties when most other European economies met with high unemploy-
ment, the Norwegian economy continued to grow along a full employment path. It seems 
obvious that the earnings from the North Sea oil had a significant positive impact on aggre-
gate demand and public revenues, and there is some statistical evidence for this hypothesis. 8 
 
The overall growth rate of GNP in Norway has been 2.7% on average in the period 1983-92, 
which is the same as in the EU (Table 1). In the latest period 1993-1998 the Norwegian 
economy grew faster than the economies of its main trading partners. In the last 25 years there 
have only been two periods with a distinct growth in unemployment: the period 1980-84 and 
the period 1988-93. The unemployment rate reached its historical peak in 1993 with 118,000 
registered unemployed people, which is 5.5% of the labour force.9 Additionally there were 
about 72,000 people ”employed” in special labour market programmes (3.4% of the labour 
                                               
8
 Eika 1996. Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1997:3. Eika calculated that the impact of the oil sector activities in 1973-
1993 may have been about 50% of the overall growth in GNP. 
9
 The unemployment rate calculated by the Labour market statistics is somewhat higher (6,0%). 
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force). An active labour market policy had a strong effect on keeping the official 
unemployment rate at a low level in the last recession.  
 
From 1993 to 1997 unemployment declined markedly, and this trend is continuing in 1998 
(Figure 1). In the same period, unemployment in the European Community is stagnating on a 
high level of 10.8% (1997).10 The Norwegian unemployment rate is expected to be lower than 
4% of the labour force in 1998 and 1999.11 
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Figure 1: Labour market development 1977 - 1998
Unemployed, active labour market policy (ALMP), vacancies
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Source: Calculated on the basis of Labour Market Statistics
 
 
What are the driving forces pushing the unemployment figures down towards a level which is 
very low compared to most other European countries? 
Why does not Norway follow the conventional wisdom, considering more real wage flexi-
bility, greater wage dispersal and lower employment insurances as necessary in order to get 
up employment?12 
 
It is not easy to give clear and unambiguous answers to these questions. As far as I can see it, 
there are several important institutional, political and structural factors that are working to-
gether, determining the favourable development in the Norwegian economy. 
                                               
10
 OECD Labour Force Statistics 1997. 
11
 Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1998 and "Nasjonalbudsjett 1999". 
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If the labour force and the labour force participation rates had decreased during the recession, 
the low unemployment figures may be realised without creating new jobs. 
But in fact, the recovery of the Norwegian economy has so far resulted in creating more than 
200,000 new jobs in the period 1993-1997. The labour force increased by 7.2% and the labour 
participation rate went up from 68.2% in 1993 to 72.4% in 1997, which is highest rate in 
historical terms (Table 2). The employment growth in Norway 1993-1997 was higher than in 
most other OECD countries including the USA.13 The figures indicate that the Norwegian 
economy is not hit by “hysteresis” to the same extent as other European countries.14 
 
Table 2: Employment development in Norway 1975 – 1997 
 Cumulative changes in 1000 
Industry 1975-1981 1981-1987 1987-1993 1993-1997 1975-1997 
 
1000 %a 1000 %a 1000 %a 1000 %a 1000 %a 
Manufacturing -33 -1.9% -26 -1.3% -60 -2.8% +39 +1.8% -80 -4.6% 
Oil extraction and mining +2 +0.1% +11 +0.6% +1 --- --- --- +14 +0.8% 
Public servicesb +132 +7.6% +101 +5.1% +11 +0.5% +90 +4.2% +334 +19.1% 
Financing and other business services +21 +1.2% +55 +2.8% -2 -0.1% +25 +1.2% +99 +5.7% 
Other sectors +89 +5.1% +49 +2.5% -126 -5.8% +58 +2.7% +70 +4.0% 
Active labour market policy +17 +1.0% +1 --- +54 +2.5% -24 -1.1% +48 +2.7% 
Unemployed --- --- +5 +0.3% +82 +3.8% -34 -1.6% +53 +3.0% 
Labour force +228 +13.1% +196 +9.9% -40 -1.8% +154 +7.2% +538 +30.8% 
Labour force in % of population 62.2% (1975) 67.9% (1981) 71.3% (1987) 68.2% (1993) 72.4% (1997) 
Comments: 
a change in % of the labour force at the beginning of the period.  
b inclusive of private social services. Exclusive of people employed by active labour market policy measures. 
Source: Calculated on the basis of Labour Market Statistics. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
12OECD 1994, 1995. Rødseth 1997:158. 
13
 OECD 1998:23. 
14
 Røed 1997. 
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4 Crisis and recovery 
Norway started exploitation of its vast oil and gas resources on the continental shelf in the 
early seventies. Everybody realised that the country was sitting on vast values of natural 
resources, which would generate high earnings in foreign currency dependent on the rate of 
extraction. A discussion about the time aspect, the dimension and the use of this “extra” 
source of income started already in 1973.15 Some people were aware of the risk that a high oil 
income could lead to expansive public budgets. The possible consequence could be that wage 
and price inflation would dismantle the international competitiveness of the traditional 
“mainland industries”. But at that time, there was no economic policy strategy aimed at facing 
the new challenges of this “nouveau riche” country. No “Oil fund” was established until more 
than twenty years later.16 
 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Unemployment
Rate of inflation
Nominal wage change
Real wage change
Figure 2: Unemployment and wage increases 1950-1997
Per cent annual change
Source: Statistisk Sentralbyå.
 
 
In the international recession in the seventies, Norway deliberately pursued an anti-cyclical 
budget policy, financing the budget deficit by future oil revenues. Strong wage increases in 
the years 1974-1977 (Figure 2) contributed to a deterioration of the international competi-
tiveness of the tradable goods sector. This started an ongoing “de-industrialisation process” in 
the mainland manufacturing industry. The number of industrial jobs decreased by 28% in the 
period 1975-1993 (Table 2). Until 1986 the public services sector and other sheltered indus-
                                               
15
 ”Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn” 1973. Noreng 1984. Hanisch 1996. 
16
 Hanisch 1996:182. 
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tries expanded strongly and the employment growth in these sectors more than compensated 
for the downsizing of the manufacturing sector. The labour force grew and in particular 
women's labour force participation rate increased. 
 
Today we can state the fact that the Norwegian government did not work out a consistent and 
long-run oriented industrial and macroeconomic policy before 1986. The economic policy in 
the seventies and eighties was myopic and did not have a theoretical foundation in spite of a 
growing acknowledgement that “the weakening of the international competitiveness of the 
mainland manufacturing industry has gone too fast".17 The macroeconomic policy mix in the 
period 1975-1986 was characterised by different measures of crisis management such as 
changing exchange rate regimes, devaluations, price and wage freezes, huge subsidies to key 
industries (i.e. shipbuilding, textiles)18 and a gradual deregulation of credit markets. 
 
In 1984, when unemployment had reached a historical peak, a new "home-made" recovery 
period started that led to a temporary reduction in unemployment (Figure 1). Traditionally, 
Norwegian monetary policy had been based on direct credit market regulations combined 
with keeping interest rates stable at a low level. But in the eighties, credit markets had to be 
gradually liberalised. At the same time there was no political support to leave interest rate 
determination to the market.19 It was quite a disastrous policy mix of free credit market supply 
and public interest rate administration that led to a huge stimulation of loan financed domestic 
demand, especially in the building and construction sector.20 Because Norwegian income tax 
law permitted everyone to make use of unlimited tax exemption of interest expenditures, the 
real rate of interest after tax was zero or even negative until policy reforms had to be con-
ducted after 1986 (Figure 3).  
 
 
                                               
17
 Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1984:41. A critical investigation of post war economic development is presented in "En 
nasjonal strategi for økt sysselsetting i 1990-årene" 1992, ch. 1 and ch. 4. 
18
 See also Nordvik 1996:42ff. 
19
 Indeed, professional economists advocated flexible interest rates in order to carry out an efficient monetary 
policy. See "Rentepolitikk" 1980. 
20
 Hanisch 1996:196ff. 
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Figure 3: Lending rates 1977-1992
nominal, real and after tax interest rates
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Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå and "Penger og kreditt i en omstillingstid" (NOU 1989:1)   
Nominal interest rate
Real interest rate before tax
Real interest rate after tax
 
 
 
In 1986 Norway was hit hard by a steep fall in crude oil prices. Public revenues decreased and 
trade balance deficits increased quickly. The social democratic government came back into 
power and decided to make a radical change in the macroeconomic policy assignment. From 
now on monetary policy was aimed at stabilising the exchange rate of Norwegian currency 
rather than stabilising the rate of interest. In fact, this policy was aimed at importing price 
stability from abroad. Labour market organisations had to accept the government's new policy 
strategy as a framework for future wage negotiations. 
 
Domestic rates of inflation declined quickly at the same time as nominal interest rates in-
creased (Figures 2 and 3). Real estate prices went down while interest expenditures increased, 
reinforced by a tax reform which reduced the tax exemption effects. Many companies as well 
as private households became insolvent. Several banks immediately lost their equity capital. 
In 1990/91 Norway went through a real bank crash when the government was forced to take 
over the largest commercial banks of the country.21  
 
                                               
21
 "Bankkrisen" 1992. 
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In all these years, employment in the manufacturing sector declined steeply while employ-
ment in the public and private services sector grew even faster, at least until 1987. In the 
period 1988-1993 unemployment increased and reached its highest level after 1945. The 
employment share of the manufacturing sector reached a bottom value of 14.5% (1995), 
which is one of the lowest rates in Western Europe. But in 1996/97, the decline of industrial 
employment stopped. After that, industrial employment has been slightly increasing, which 
may indicate that the industrial sector in Norway – through downsizing and structural changes 
– has achieved a satisfactory level of productivity and international competitiveness. A new 
period of growth and expansion has started. 
 
The recent recovery period of the Norwegian economy started in 1993. As shown by the 
employment figures, the Norwegian economy has gone from a long period of deindustrialisa-
tion to a period of industrial reconstruction and re-industrialisation. As a result of the 
accelerated export growth in mainland industries, the trade balance deficit for “traditional 
goods” (exclusive oil and gas) has been stabilised at around 22% of the aggregated export 
value excluding oil products. Traditional exports are growing slightly faster than traditional 
imports (Figure 4). Therefore, at the same time when oil revenues are reaching a top level the 
economy’s dependence on the offshore sector is not increasing further. Traditional exports are 
growing in step with traditional imports because the mainland industry has strengthened its 
competitiveness during the last years. 
 
Figure 4: Exports and imports 1992-1997 (1992=100)
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
19
92
=1
00
Source: Statistisk Sentralbyrå. Nasjonalbudsjett 1998 and 1999.
Export of oil and gas
Export of traditional goods Import of traditional
 goods
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5 Norwegian economic policy regime in the nineties 
 
Full employment has been the superior economic policy objective in Norway in the post-war 
period.22 In Norway, a special "social democratic economic policy paradigm" has a long tra-
dition. The policy contains the following key elements:23 
• Centralised wage bargaining. 
• Strong labour unions. 
• Close relationship and co-operation between labour union and labour party government. 
• Society agrees on full employment as the overall goal of economic policy. 
• Strong emphasis on income policy as a key element of managing the economy. 
• Co-operation between labour market organisations. 
• The government plays an active “third part” in income pol icy agreements. 
• Society prefers an egalitarian wage policy. 
• Extensive use of active labour market policies. 
• Macroeconomic planning by the use of annual "national budgets" and long-term pro-
grammes.24 
The "Oslo School", founded by the Norwegian Nobel Price winners Ragnar Frisch and 
Trygve Haavelmo and their disciples delivered the theoretical basis for the policy.  
The "corporatist compromise" is a very decisive constituent part of the Norwegian economic 
policy system. All the time after 1945 and until the nineties, there has been political consen-
sus that international competitiveness of the export sector has to be preserved and improved.25 
 
Some key elements in the new policy strategy after 1986 
In 1986 a new Labour Party government took over and - facing a severe crisis in the Norwe-
gian economy caused by a steep fall in oil prices - introduced a new economic policy para-
digm: 
• From now on, monetary policy was subordinate to the overall goal of a stable exchange 
rate.  
                                               
22
 See Moene and Wallerstein 1997:26. 
23
 Schewe 1990, Hanisch 1996. 
24
 The ”National Budget” is the annual official document of the government's economic policy programme for 
the coming year.  
25
 Nordvik 1996:35. 
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• The Central Bank of Norway was allowed to adjust the interest rate in order to stabilise 
the exchange rate.  
• The government made it clear that no further exchange rate devaluations would be carried 
out. 
• Since monetary policy was assigned to preserve exchange rate stability but not domestic 
price stability, import of price stability from the main trade partner countries in Europe 
became a policy objective. Income policy had to adapt to the exogenous rate of inflation. 
 
The "new" policy was a revival of the well-known "Scandinavian model" of inflation and 
wage determination in a small open economy.26 This policy change in 1986 was necessary but 
not sufficient to bring the Norwegian economy back to a full employment path based on 
international competitiveness of the core mainland industries. As we have shown above, in 
1986/87 there were still high rates of price inflation and strong nominal wage increases in 
combination with extremely low real interest rates due to the old income tax system. So, the 
economic policy reformation process had to continue. At least three other reforms were 
decisive in re-establishing industrial competitiveness and growth: (1) a tax reform, (2) a 
corporatist income policy based on a "Solidarity Alternative" agreement, (3) the establishment 
of the "Government Petroleum Fund". 
 
(1) Tax reform 
The Norwegian government carried out a radical reform of the income tax system, mainly in 
1992. The aim was "that the income tax system has to contribute to a resource allocation that 
is more effective than before".27 The marginal income tax rate was reduced to a maximum 
rate of 49% (including social fees). The taxation rate for all capital income was put down to 
28%. Many tax deduction and tax allowance rules were abandoned. The tax reform led to a 
significant change in the taxpayer incitement structure: saving in both bank deposits and real 
investments became much more profitable than before. The unproductive investment of 
borrowing money in order to get tax exemption became costly. 
                                               
26
 Aukrust 1977. 
27
 Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1993:40. See also OECD 1995b:37. 
  
 
14 
(2) Solidarity Alternative Agreement 
A new policy agreement was shaped in 199228, the so-called “Solidarity Alternative" agree-
ment.29 As the title indicates, the policy strategy programme focuses on employed peoples' 
solidarity with the unemployed. The agreement was a powerful revival of the corporatist 
policy of compromise. In fact, it is the left-wing Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions 
who is most vehemently defending the new income policy agreement. 
 
The primary goal of the economic policy deal is to gain full employment by restoring and 
then maintaining international competitiveness of the exposed mainland industries. The 
institutional assignment of the economic policy strategy is based on both co-operation and the 
dividing up of responsibilities. In institutional terms, the policy strategy of the "Solidarity 
Alternative" is based on the co-operation of four core institutions in the Norwegian political 
economy: the government, the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry, the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and the Central Bank of Norway.30 
 
• The government has to carry out a counter-cyclical fiscal policy in order to stabilise the 
economy throughout the business cycle. 
• Monetary policy carried out by the central bank has to guarantee and defend a stable 
exchange rate of the domestic currency. 
• Income and labour market policies have to contribute to low price and cost increases in 
order to preserve sufficient international competitiveness and employment in the mainland 
industries. Central wage bargaining has to guarantee low nominal wage increase. 
• Other industrial policy measures have to be designed in order to improve the resource 
allocation in the economy. 
• Stable exchange rates together with moderate wage increases will give exposed industries 
both favourable and stable working conditions to compete in international markets. 
• Additionally, stable exchange rates contribute to stabilising real wages.  
 
The labour market organisations agreed that the new income policy based on the "Solidarity 
Alternative" agreement has to be followed up for a period of  several years. 
                                               
28
 A short look at the history is presented in "Nasjonalbudsjett 1998", ch. 4. 
29
 Its theoretical and political foundation is worked out in the report of the income policy committee: "En 
nasjonal strategi for økt sysselsetting i 1990-årene" 1992. 
30
 See "Nasjonalbudsjett 1998": ch. 1 and ch. 4. 
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Table 3: Government Fiscal Budget and Government 
Petroleum Fund 1997 - 1998 (billions of NOK) 
 1997 1998 Pct. of 
GDP1) 
Total budget revenues  473.3 499.0 43.6% 
Net revenues from petroleum sector = transfer to the 
petroleum fond2) 
85.0 87.1 7.8% 
Revenues excl. petroleum sector 366.2 386.8 33.7% 
Expenditure excl. petroleum sector 389.0 405.0 35.5% 
Non-oil budget deficit covered by transfer from the 
petroleum fond  
- 22.8 - 18.3 2.1% 
Dividend and interest on the petroleum fund 3.3 5.0 0.3% 
Petroleum fund surplus  65.5 73.9 6.0% 
Source: National budget and fiscal budget 1998.  
1) GDP = NOK 1,085.1 bn (1997). 2) Revenues excl. government expenditures on petroleum activities. 
 
 
(3) The Petroleum Fund 
Compared to other European economies, Norway is faced with a special problem: how can 
the increasing trade balance surplus from oil and gas exports in the next twenty years be 
managed without recurring to a new period of cost inflation and de-industrialisation? There-
fore, a "Government Petroleum Fund" was established by law in 1990. The fund was taken 
into use as an integrated part of the fiscal budget in 1996.31 Annual fund revenues are 
government's net cash flow from the petroleum sector plus interest income from the fund 
deposits. Then, the non-oil-budget deficit is covered by transfers from the oil fund.32 Table 3 
shows main figures of the fund. The annual fund surplus is to be invested in foreign bonds 
and equities. The petroleum fund is expected to reach a peak around the year 2020 when 
accumulated net revenues are predicted to amount to 140% of GDP. Thereafter, depletion of 
oil resources and growing public pension payments will successively drain the fund of capital. 
 
Results of the new policy regime 
As we have shown above, the results from implementing the "Solidarity Alternative" look 
very impressive so far.33 Price, production and employment effects are significant: 
• Wage increases have successfully been restrained. 
• Consumer price inflation has successfully been restrained. 
• Growth in the mainland industry has accelerated. 
                                               
31
 See "The National Budget 1998", ch. 2 and 6. 
32
 In fact, the fund accounts show three core economic indicators: (a) overall state budget surplus, (b) non-oil-
budget surplus (i.e. state budget surplus excluding all net revenues from the petroleum sector), (c) accumulation 
of public financial wealth which is to be invested in foreign bonds and stocks. 
33
 See also OECD 1997:5. OECD 1998:1ff. 
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• Many new jobs have been created. 
• Export market shares have increased. 
• Structural trade balance deficits in the mainland sector are about to decrease slightly.  
 
Table 4: International cost competitiveness of Norwegian industry 
Selected indicators, annual change in % 
 1981 
- 88 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Relative earnings per worker, 
common currency 
0.9 -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 -2.3 -3.7 -2.6 3.7 0.7 2.1 
Relative price of capital goods, 
common currency 
1.9 -2.2 -5.2 -2.3 -0.4 -1 -0.9 4.8 .. .. 
Relative interest rate, 
common currency 
1.8 1.6 -0.3 -1.2 2.7 -2.1 -1.3 1.7 0.3 0.1 
Relative consumer price 
deflator, common currency 
1.1 -0.2 -2.5 -3.6 -0.1 -2.6 -2.2 2.4 -0.7 1.4 
Effective foreign exchange rate 1.7 -0.2 0.7 1.8 -1 2.1 1.4 -2.3 0.1 -0.6 
Source: "Etter inntektsoppgjørene 1998", Table 5.1.  
 
 
In fact, the new income policy agreement did not bring about lower real wages for the 
workers (Figure 2). Quite surprisingly, real wage growth was stronger in the period 1991-
1997 than in previous years when the nominal wage and price growth was much higher.34 
 
The economic policy regime of the "Solidarity Alternative" focuses on the international cost 
competitiveness of the mainland industries. The change in relative earnings per employee is 
an important indicator of international competitiveness. In the 1988-1994 period, the 
Norwegian relative wage rate decreased by 13% as a result of moderate wage agreements 
(Table 4).35 However, relative wage growth in 1995-1997 changed to positive which may 
indicate that the wage policy according to the "Solidarity Alternative" agreement is under 
pressure.36  
 
                                               
34
 "Nasjonalbudsjett 1998". 
35
 Indicators in table 4 are defined as "relative" changes, i.e. differences between the percentage change in 
Norway and the percentage change in trade partner countries. 
36
 "Indeed, while the Solidarity Alternative framework has served the country well to pull the economy out of 
protracted stagnation and restore full employment, under current conditions it seems set to face increasing 
difficulties in forestalling a rise in the rate of inflation." OECD 1998:3. 
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6 Conclusion and further challenges 
As many experts point out, the case of Norway is special in several matters. With its vast 
petroleum resources, the country earns high-income flows from the oil and gas exports – in 
the private sector as well as in the public sector. Therefore, the government is not faced with 
financial restrictions in order to offer the mainland sector a favourable macroeconomic envi-
ronment.37 The huge earnings from the North Sea give rise to big current account surplus in 
many years. While other countries may envy Norway the favourable economic situation, the 
Norwegian government is faced with special policy dilemmas and challenges to the national 
political economy.  
 
If all oil export revenues are spent "at home", domestic demand pressure will lead to wage 
and price increases and deteriorate the competitiveness position of the mainland industries 
(the option may be called "internal revaluation"). If not spent at home, the continuing net 
inflow of foreign currency will push the exchange rate of domestic currency upwards (the 
option may be called "external revaluation"). In order to face this policy dilemma and to keep 
sufficient competitiveness in the mainland economy, the government established the "Petro-
leum fund" as part of the state fiscal budget in 199638 (Table 3). Fund deposits have to be 
invested in bonds and stocks abroad. This capital outflow will reduce the upward pressure on 
the exchange rate value of the Norwegian currency and reduce public expenditures. Due to the 
"Solidarity Alternative" agreement, the monetary policy is aimed at defending a stable 
exchange rate. This means that appreciation pressure on the exchange rate has to be accom-
modated by lower interest rates and vice versa. In this way, the monetary policy may cause 
pro-cyclical effects. Therefore, the Central Bank of Norway advises the government to change 
the monetary policy target. Monetary policy should aim at stabilising the rate of domestic 
inflation instead of stabilising the exchange rate. 39 
 
As a result of the policy reforms, income distribution is changing and thus bringing along 
another challenge to the new Norwegian economic policy paradigm. High productivity and 
good marketing performance in private companies generate high profits. Capital owners and 
business leaders in top management positions are not restricted to benefit from growing com-
pany earnings. On the contrary, the organised wage earners are submitted to the agreement of 
                                               
37
 Holden 1996. Rødseth 1997. 
38
 "The National Budget 1998", ch. 6. 
39
 Norges Bank 1997. 
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low wage increases due to the "Solidarity Alternative". Additionally, recent income tax 
reforms favour people with high shares of capital income. Not surprisingly, the income distri-
bution has become more unequal in the last years.40 In the longer run, this may lead to erosion 
of the egalitarian income distribution which has been an essential constituent of the Norwe-
gian social democratic society. 
 
Full employment is the main objective of the "Solidarity Alternative" agreement. But full 
employment, when realised, is going to challenge just the same policy agreement. Even 
though the “natural” (or "equilibrium") rate of unemployment is lower in Norway than in 
most other countries41, an increasing labour shortage in industries such as manufacturing and  
health and social services at least gives rise to an accelerating wage drift. A new business 
cycle may start and lead to demand-pull- and cost-push inflation. 
 
The Norwegian model has proved effective in regaining industrial growth, high employment 
and low inflation. But "the crucial test of Norwegian wage setting and income policy"42 is to 
manage bottlenecks in the labour market in the long run without returning to a new period of 
wage inflation, unemployment and industrial decline. 
 
How can the Norwegian government face the challenges in the present period of huge "extra 
earnings" from the oil sector? In order to avoid a new vicious circle of inflation and following 
de-industrialisation in exposed industries, at least one of three alternative policy strategies has 
to be pursued: 
a) Increasing taxes, decreasing public expenditure and investing budget surplus abroad, 
managed by the Petroleum Fund can reduce the overall demand pressure in the economy. 43  
b) The rate of oil and gas extraction in the North Sea can be reduced. Lower annual export 
surplus will reduce the demand pressure in the mainland economy.  
b) Imports of both goods and labour from other countries can be increased. Increased imports 
will reduce the demand pressure in domestic commodity and labour markets.44  
 
                                               
40
 Epland 1997. 
41
 OECD 1997:63f. 
42
 Holden 1996. 
43
 Tax increases will reduce wage earners disposable income and thus weaken labour unions' support of the 
solidarity alternative agreement. 
44
 In fact, Norway has started to import qualified workers in the health sector (nurses and doctors). There is also 
a growing scarcity of high skilled engineers and computer specialists. 
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The three strategy alternatives are not mutually exclusive. A well co-ordinated mix of all three 
strategies may be more realistic and appropriate. 
 
Apart from these special demand pressure problems following the huge revenues from the oil 
sector, the Norwegian "mainland economy" seems to be in good shape and able to face the 
globalisation era. Social consensus and policies of "corporatist compromise" based on the 
"Solidarity Alternative" agreement are important determinants. Further policy reforms in the 
eighties and nineties promoted deregulation and competition and thus contributed to make 
Norwegian companies competitive both at home and in foreign markets.  
 
A solidary income policy seems to be a necessary prerequisite to get the Norwegian economy 
back to continuing industrial growth and full employment. But it seems too simple to explain 
the employment growth and the creation of all the many new jobs only in income policy 
terms. Other social, institutional and political factors have to be investigated further in order 
to give a more comprehensive explanation of the Norwegian case. Income policy based on 
solidarity is not a sufficient prerequisite to maintain a full employment economic growth!  
 
 
Figure 5: Economic policy strategy towards national
competitive advantage in the global economy
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Income policy alone cannot explain the Norwegian employment and industrial growth 
miracle. Further research will have to analyse other factors that may have an effect on the 
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special dynamics governing Norwegian industrial activity outside the oil sector. This includes 
modern leadership and management styles, increasing marketing efforts in all the numerous 
small and medium sized firms which are going international, as well as other behavioural 
factors such as peoples' positive attitude towards challenges of the new globalisation era. 
Strategic trade policy, industrial policies and labour market measures aimed at promoting 
efficiency and flexibility in the labour market would also have to be analysed. Figure 5 shows 
a tentative model of an overall strategy towards national competitiveness in a global 
economy. Like a jigsaw puzzle, the elements of this model represent different policy parame-
ters. They have to be investigated and put together to a consistent economic policy pro-
gramme. 
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